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The sustainability and adjustment of current account imbalances among the
world’s major industrialized countries is a subject that is receiving consider-
able attention among policymakers, ﬁnancial market practitioners and aca-
demics. At more than $600 billion and nearly 6 percent of US GDP, the US
current account deﬁcit attracts the most focus, but there are also material
current account imbalances in other deﬁcit countries such as the UK and in
surplus countries such as Japan and Germany.
Some respected experts have expressed concern that current account im-
balances of this magnitude and persistence indicate that the global economy
is operating in a “danger zone” in which disruptive and volatile reactions in
currency, bond, and equity markets are likely to result. For example, in C.
Fred Bergsten (2002) has argued that ”research at both the Federal Reserve
Board and the Institute for International Economics reveals that industrial
countries, including the United States, enter a “danger zone” of current ac-
count unsustainability when their deﬁcits reach 4-5 percent of GDP[...] At
these levels, corrective forces tend to arise either spontaneously from market
forces or by policy action”. Other observers have made a similar point, ar-
guing that there is a “threshold” current account imbalance beyond which
current account adjustment must ultimately take place, even if evidence of
adjustment is scarce or non-existent before the threshold is reached. This
point of view is represented clearly in a recent survey paper on this subject
prepared by the Fed Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Holman (2001)):
While there is considerable uncertainty about the precise thresh-
2old [...] a current account deﬁcit greater than 4.2 percent of GDP
is unsustainable. This estimate, based on the 1980s and early
1990s, represents the average threshold at which current account
deﬁcits in several industrialized economies started to narrow after
trending up for a sustained period.
Existing empirical work on this subject is suggestive but is not in fact
speciﬁcally aimed at answering the question “are there thresholds of cur-
rent account adjustment”, or exploring its implications. Inﬂuential papers
by Milesi Ferretti-Razin (1998) and Freund (2000) employ a careful and in-
formative methodology to pull together a set of empirical regularities about
how adjustments of large current account deﬁcits have taken place in previous
“episodes” which meet certain ex ante criteria. For example, in order for a
current account deﬁcit adjustment episode (called a reversal) to be included
in the Freund sample, it must meet the following four criteria:
1. The current account deﬁcit exceeded two percent of GDP before
the reversal.
2. The average deﬁcit was reduced by at least two percent of GDP
over three years (from the minimum to the three-year average).
3. The maximum deﬁcit in the ﬁve years after the reversal was not
larger than the minimum deﬁcit in the three years before the reversal.
4. The current account was reduced by at least one third.
These are very similar to the criteria introduced by Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin (1998) in their study. Their motivation for focusing on the adjust-
ment of large current account deﬁcits that meet these criteria is explained as
3follows:
In the deﬁnition of reversal events we want to capture large
and persistent improvements in the current account imbalance,
that go beyond short-run current account ﬂuctuations as a result
of consumption smoothing. The underlying idea is that “large”
events provide more information on determinants of reductions
in current account deﬁcits than short run ﬂuctuations.
The work of Milesi Ferretti - Razin, Freund, and — using a somewhat
diﬀerent methodology Mann (2002) — has had an impact on the way that
policymakers discuss current account adjustment, especially in the context
of the record US deﬁcits recorded in recent years. For example, Federal
Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2003), citing Freund’s work has said:
[W]hat do we know about whether the process of reining in
our current account deﬁcit will be benign to the economies of the
United States and the world? According to a Federal Reserve staﬀ
study, current account deﬁcits that emerged among developed
countries since 1980 have risen as high as double-digit percentages
of GDP before markets enforced a reversal. The median high has
been about 5 percent of GDP.
While much can be and has been learned by studying past episodes of ad-
justment of large current account deﬁcits (as deﬁned by the criteria used by
Milesi Ferretti-Razin and Freund), there remains a number of unresolved em-
pirical questions pertaining to the modeling, estimation, and interpretation
4of the current adjustment process among the large industrialized countries.
These questions include:
• Does the process of adjusting to current account deﬁcits diﬀer from the
process of adjusting to current account surpluses? (does sign matter?)
• Does the process of adjusting to ”large” current account imbalances
diﬀer from the process of adjusting to smaller current imbalances? (does
size matter?)
• If so, is there a way to estimate how large is ”large” and does this
estimate diﬀer from country to country? (does one size ﬁta l l ? )
• Is the absence of evidence about the adjustment of a large current
account imbalance evidence in favor of the sustainability of said large
imbalance? (is the absence of evidence evidence of sustainability?)
It is the aim of this paper to provide an empirical framework that can
be used to begin to answer questions such as these. We will argue that,
for any particular country, all four of these issues are in fact intrinsically
related to one another and to the speciﬁcation of the econometric model
which best describes that country’s current account dynamics. If the current
account, suitably scaled by net output (GDP net of investment and govern-
ment purchases), is a linear, stationary stochastic process with a constant
unconditional mean, as is often assumed in empirical work, then the answers
to these four questions are straightforward: ‘no’, ‘no’, ‘moot’, and ‘yes’.
An immediate implication of stationarity is that any current account/net
output ratio not equal to the unconditional mean is unsustainable by the
5deﬁnition of a stationary stochastic process. This applies to surpluses as well
as deﬁcits. However, as an empirical matter, the dynamic process by which
the current account adjusts to its unconditional mean depends crucially on
whether the process is linear or nonlinear. In particular, if the process is
linear, adjustment is symmetric above and below the long-run equilibrium,
and the speed of adjustment is independent of the magnitude of the dis-
placement from long-run equilibrium (the unconditional mean). For a linear,
stationary current account/net output process, there is nothing to be gained
by just focusing on the adjustment of current account deﬁcits and excluding
the data on adjustment to surpluses (all relative to the unconditional mean
current account/net output ratio which may be either positive or negative).
Moreover, there is no reason to focus on the adjustment to “large” deﬁcits
as providing diﬀerent or more information than episodes of adjustment to
small deﬁcits (relative to the unconditional mean) since all episodes provide
the same information. Finally, as should be obvious by now, for a linear sta-
tionary stochastic process there is no particular ”threshold” beyond which
markets and/or shifts in policy force a reversal and below which adjustment
is absent.
By contrast, if the stationary stochastic process which governs the cur-
rent account adjustment to its long mean is non-linear, then both the “sign”
and “size” of the current account imbalance does matter for the adjustment
process, and the size of the current account imbalance beyond which adjust-
ment takes place may well be country speciﬁc (as alluded to by Chairman
Greenspan and as is suggested by the empirical work cited above). Finally,
if the stationary stochastic process is non-linear, absence of evidence of ad-
6justment of a large current account imbalance is not evidence of the absence
of the ultimate adjustment of the imbalance.
There is a tractable and testable nonlinear time series model that conve-
niently exhibits all of the features of the current account adjustment process
that have been the focus of recent discussions, and that nests as a special case
the linear stationary stochastic process model for the current account that is
often assumed in empirical work. It is the threshold auto regression model
introduced in Tong (1978) and studied extensively by Hansen (1996,1999a,
1999b). For a stationary stochastic threshold model with mean µ and thresh-
olds δ and δ, there is no tendency for ca = current account/net output − µ
to adjust to its mean of 0 unless it has crossed either the threshold δ or the
threshold δ. In the ‘regime’ with δ <c a<δ,d e ﬁcits or surpluses (relative
to µ) persist, and there is no tendency for imbalances to revert. However,
the absence of evidence of mean reversion in this regime is not evidence
that deﬁcits or surpluses relative to µ are ‘sustainable’ since, by stationarity,
the only sustainable current account imbalance is equal to the unconditional
mean.
In a threshold model, a necessary condition for adjustment to commence
is for ca to cross either the deﬁcit threshold δ or the surplus threshold δ,
parameters which can be estimated from the data, not imposed ex ante. In
the deﬁcit adjustment regime, ca < δ ,a n dcat = ρcat−1 + εt. Adjustment
continues until ca reaches δ at which point any further adjustment is driven
by shocks to εt. In the surplus regime adjustment regime, ca > δ ,a n d
cat = ρcat−1 + εt. Adjustment continues until ca reaches δ at which point
any further adjustment is driven by shocks to εt. Evidently, in a threshold
7model, the sign and size of the ca imbalance can matter, thresholds can
diﬀer across countries, and the absence of evidence of adjustment is not the
evidence of absence of future
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic
empirical predictions of the modern workhorse model of the current account,
the rational expectations, intertemporal approach model developed in Sachs
(1981, 1982), estimated by Sheﬀrin and Woo (1989), and recently extended
by Kano (2003). The basic prediction of this model, once one allows for per-
manent shocks to the level of net output as in Campbell and Deaton (1989),
is that the ratio of the current account to net output (GDP less investment
less government purchases) should be a stationary stochastic process with an
unconditional mean determined by the relationship between the real interest
rate and the per capita rate of growth. We also argue that a general equi-
librium, two-country version of the Weil (1989) inﬁnite horizon, overlapping
generations model of the current account — a model in which the global real
interest rate and the net foreign asset or liability position of each country is
endogenously determined — also has the prediction that the current account
to net output ratio is constant in steady state and determined by underlying
parameters such as rates of time preference, the steady state rate of global
growth, and the relative size of the two countries. In our paper, we will fol-
low most of the empirical work in this area and take the stationarity of the
current account to net output ratio as given. The question at the heart of
the present paper is whether or not the stationary stochastic process which
describes the current account to net output ratio in the G7 countries features
linear or nonlinear adjustment to the unconditional mean. We conclude Sec-
8tion 2 by presenting, for each G7 country the results of a non-parametric
statistical test of the null hypothesis of a linear adjustment of the current
account to net output ratio against the alternative of non-linear adjustment
using quarterly data for the sample 1979:1 - 2003:3. This is an application of
a test for nonlinearity developed by Terasvirta (1994). For the G7 countries
in our sample, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence against the null of
l i n e a ra d j u s t m e n to ft h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n tt on e to u t p u tr a t i oa n di nf a v o ro f
the alternative of nonlinear adjustment.
In Section 3 of the paper, we estimate for each G7 country a threshold
autoregressive model of the current account to net output ratio, allowing
for country-speciﬁc thresholds of current account surplus and deﬁcit adjust-
ment in each country (as suggested, for example, by Chairman Greenspan’s
comments), and also allowing for country speciﬁc means for the ratio of the
current account to net output (as suggested, for example, by the general
equilibrium version of the Weil model reviewed in Section 2). Our main ﬁnd-
ings in this section are as follows. For most of the G7 countries, we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence of threshold eﬀects in current account adjustment. We
also ﬁnd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a random walk for the
current account imbalance in each country when that ratio does not exceed
(in absolute value) the country speciﬁc surplus and deﬁcit thresholds (rela-
tive to the country speciﬁc mean) estimated for that country. For most of
the G7 countries, unless the current account imbalance is ‘too large’ — as
suggested by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) — there does not appear to
be a systematic tendency for adjustment to occur. A further advantage of
our approach is that we can estimate from the data how large a current im-
9balance has to be before this imbalance triggers an adjustment, and we can
allow these estimated thresholds to diﬀer across countries. In fact we ﬁnd
substantial cross country variation in the surplus and deﬁcit thresholds that
trigger current account adjustment in each country. We also ﬁnd evidence
of cross country and cross regime variation in the autoregressive dynamics
estimated during adjustment regimes for each country
In Section 4, we investigate what happens to the probability distribu-
tions of nominal exchange rate changes, stock price index changes, and long
term interest rate diﬀerentials during the various current account adjustment
regimes that we estimate for each country in Section 3. The motivation is to
determine whether or not crossing the current account adjustment threshold
is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions for exchange
rates, stock prices, and interest diﬀerentials. We speciﬁcally account for — and
allow for current account regime-speciﬁc shifts in — autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity as well as for shifts in the mean by estimating generalized
autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) models for nominal
exchange rate changes, stock prices changes, and interest diﬀerentials. We
also in this section explore, for the US, whether or not the expectation of
a future adjustment in the current account imbalance is associated with a
present shift in the probability distribution of exchange rates, stock prices,
or interest diﬀerentials. We proxy this by including in the GARCH models
two dummy variables (one for deﬁcits and one for surpluses) which represent
the distance between the current account imbalance and its country-speciﬁc
mean when the imbalance is between the thresholds.
In Section 5, we draw on our empirical results to take stock of the present
10US current account deﬁcit. Our empirical results indicate that compared to
other G7 countries, the US over our sample exhibited relatively wide thresh-
olds within which current account adjustment is absent and relatively slow
speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially the deﬁcit threshold,
are crossed. Moreover, the present US current account deﬁcit substantially
exceeds — and has for some time — our estimated thresholds of current account
deﬁcit adjustment for the US. We explore several possible explanations. The
ﬁrst is that the threshold model, while a useful description of current account
adjustment for other G7 countries, does not apply to the US and that the
present deﬁcit of nearly 6 percent of GDP is in fact sustainable. The second
explanation is that there are thresholds of current account adjustment for
the US, but that adjustment has been delayed over the past several years,
due to unusual circumstances that were not in evidence during the sam-
ple over which the models were estimated, 1979-2003. These circumstances
could include: (i) the low level of global real interest rates (which support
higher levels of investment and lower levels of saving in the US than would
be the case with historically average or above average real interest rates);
(ii) the more muted and less uniform decline in the dollar than occurred, for
example, during the 1985 - 1987 Plaza-Louvre episode (reﬂecting the inter-
vention activities of Asian central banks); (iii) the fact that the US continues
to run a substantial surplus in dividends, interest, and proﬁts on its stock
of foreign assets compared with the dividends, interest, and proﬁts that it
pays out on its much larger stock of foreign liabilities; (iv) the adjustment in
the net foreign liability position of the US that occurs as a result of dollar
depreciation (which in 2003 oﬀset almost 80 percent of that year’s current
11account deﬁcit). We review and evaluate these potential explanations for the
absence of adjustment to date in the US current account deﬁcit even though
it has passed well beyond thresholds that would have triggered adjustments
in other G7 countries.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 A Test for Non-Linear Current Account
Adjustment
2.1 Theoretical Considerations
In our empirical work, we shall be modeling the dynamics of G7 current
account adjustment. However, it is important to take a stand as to exactly
what it is to which G7 current account imbalances are adjusting. In this
paper, we draw on the implications for long-run current account equilibrium
of the workhorse intertemporal model of the current account (Sachs, 1981;
Sheﬀrin and Woo, 1990, via Campbell, 1987). This model can be written
CAt = −Et
P
(1 + r)−i∆Zt+i where Zt = Yt − It − Gt is the level of net
output. The intertemporal approach models have been estimated and tested
many times, and their high frequency implications — that current account
dynamics are fully described by the discounted sum of future changes in net
output — are usually rejected. However, we argue that the intertemporal
model, properly speciﬁed to allow for stationarity in long run growth rates,
contains an important insight about the long run behavior of the current
account. It would seem preferable to model ∆logZt = ∆zt as stationary.
12Following Campbell and Deaton (1989), it is straightforward to show (Kano,
2003) that the log-linear approximation of the intertemporal approach model
is given by CAt/Zt ≈− Et
P
(1+r −g)−i∆zt+i where g is the unconditional
mean of ∆zt.N o t et h a ti ft h el o gd i ﬀerence of net output is stationary, it is
t h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n tt on e to u t p u tratio which is stationary, not simply the
current account itself. This seems like a more sensible long-run equilibrium
condition than to assume that the current account itself is stationary.
The intertemporal approach model is partial equilibrium and is usually
studied for the special case in which r is equal to the rate of time preference.
However, the basic prediction of that model — that the ratio CA/Z is constant
in the long run — also holds in the steady state of a two-country version of
Weil’s (1989) inﬁnite horizon overlapping generations model. As shown in
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1994, page 188), the Weil model with discount factor β
implies that the steady state current account to net output ratio is constant
and given by CA/Z =( n + g)θ where n i st h er a t eo fp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t h ,g
is the rate of net output growth, and θ is the endogenous ratio of net foreign
assets to net output given by the solution to θ[1−(1+r)β/(1+n)(1+g)] =
[(1 + r)β − (1 + g)]/(1 + n)(1 + g)(r − g). Now imagine two such economies
trading goods and bonds with one another that diﬀer in two respects: size
and the discount factor. Let β1 <β 2 and suppose that country 2 is larger
than country 1. It is easy to show that in the steady state of a two-country
version of the Weil model, the β1 smaller country will run a steady state
c u r r e n ta c c o u n tt on e to u t p u td e ﬁcit and the larger more patient β2 country
will run a steady state current account to net output surplus. Based on these
considerations, we shall assume that for each G7 country, the ratio CA/Z is
13stationary and allow for country speciﬁcm e a n si nt h eCA/Z ratio.
2.2 Testing for Non-Linearities in G7 Current Account
Adjustment
This paper is an empirical study of G7 current account adjustment, based on
quarterly data for the period 1979:1 to 2003:3 (the data available when we
began our study in the fall of 2003). We choose our starting date to begin
six years after the advent of ﬂoating exchange rates and the initial global-
ization of the international capital market that occurred at that time and in
conjunction with the ﬁrst oil shock. The data in the analysis are obtained
from the International Financial Statistics Database by the IMF. All vari-
ables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in national currency. According
to national account statistics, the current account variable is estimated as the
sum of net exports and net primary income from abroad (NPIA); net output
is obtained by subtracting Government consumption expenditure and gross
ﬁxed capital formation (investment) to GDP.
We test for non-linearity in G7 current account/net output adjustment
following the non-parametric test for nonlinearity developed by Luukkonen
et al. (1988) and Terasvirta (1994). These authors propose a Lagrange
Multiplier test for a third-order Taylor approximation to the regression func-
tion of the form: cat = β00 +
p P
i=1
[β1icat−1 + β2icat−icat−d + β3icat−ica2
t−d +
β4icat−ica3
t−d]+εt.T h i s a r t i ﬁcial regression allows to identify general non-
linearity through the signiﬁcance of the higher-order terms. The main ad-
v a n t a g eo ft h i st y p eo ft e s ti st h a ti tc a nb ec a r r i e do u tb ys i m p l eO L Sa n d
14that — despite being designed for smooth transition regressions — is sensitive
to a wide range of non-linearities (Granger and Terasvirta, 1993), although
there is reason to suspect that the power of the test may be weak against
some nonlinear alternatives. The results of this test are reported in Table 1.
- Insert table 1 here -
Hence, evidence of nonlinear adjustment is indicated at the 5% signif-
icance level for France, Germany and Japan, and at the 7% level for the
US.
Using the multivariate bootstrap test procedure developed by Hansen
(1997), the null hypothesis of linear adjustment in all countries is rejected
at the 14% level. Given the possibly poor power characteristics of these
tests, therefore, we felt encouraged to investigate the estimation of nonlinear
models more directly.
3 Estimating and Testing Thresholds Models
of G7 Current Account Adjustment
In this section of the paper, we estimate and test for each G7 country a
threshold autoregression model of the current-account-to-net-output ratio
using the univariate approach developed in Hansen (1996). We allow for and
estimate country-speciﬁc means, country and regime-speciﬁc thresholds, and
country and regime speciﬁc dynamic adjustment once the current account
15has crossed either of the thresholds. Letting ca = CA/Z − µ , we write the
equilibrium threshold autoregressive (TAR) model as
cat = ρ×1{cat−d,δ}×cat−1+ρ×1{cat−d,δ}×cat−1 + (1)
+(1 − 1{cat−d,δ}) × (1 − 1{cat−d,δ}) × cat−1+et
where 1{cat−d,δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 when
cat−d > δ > 0 (and zero otherwise) and 1{cat−d,δ} is an indicator function
that takes on a value of 1 when cat−d <δ6 0 (and zero otherwise). This
approach postulates that the persistence of the current account imbalance in
a country may depend upon whether or not the current account imbalance
has crossed a surplus ‘threshold’ of δ > 0 or a deﬁcit threshold of δ 6 0.W e
note that a special case of the threshold model is the case in which δ = δ =0
and ρ = ρ < 1 in which case it collapses to a linear stationary AR(1) process.
We experimented with a threshold TAR(2) speciﬁcation but found in general
the second lag terms to be insigniﬁcant, and thus conﬁne our presentation to
the TAR(1) models. We also select a delay parameter d of two quarters as
this maximises the ﬁt of the regression in each case.
The threshold model can potentially identify three regimes of current ac-
count adjustment: a surplus adjustment regime, a deﬁcit adjustment regime,
and an ‘inertia’ regime δ<cat−2 <δin which the current account appears
to follow a random walk. In a more general smooth threshold transition au-
toregressive or STAR model (e.g. Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001), the speed
of adjustment does not increase discontinuously at the threshold; rather, the
16further way is the current-account-to-GDP ratio from its long-run mean, the
faster the current account imbalance adjusts. Interestingly, when we experi-
mented with estimating smooth transmission models, we found they did not
c a p t u r eG 7c u r r e n ta c c o u n td y n a m i c si nas e n s i b l ew a y .A sw es h a l lr e p o r t
next, there does in fact appear to be important, discrete threshold eﬀects
which inﬂuence current account adjustment.
Before presenting the results, we will discuss some issues involved in the
estimation and testing of these model for a system comprised of the G7
countries. The ca variables for the G7 group are ﬁrst demeaned, in order
to allow for the existence of long-run deﬁcit/surplus means for each country
rather than a zero ca balance. A non-zero mean proves to be applicable
for all G7 countries, with the single exception of Italy. In particular, we
detect a structural break in the German series in 1991, corresponding with
the German uniﬁcation and the resulting change in the country national
accounts; we account for the break by allowing two diﬀerent means in the
current account for the pre- and post-uniﬁcation periods.
The two asymmetric thresholds in the TAR model are selected jointly by
minimisation of the overall sum of squared errors. The estimation method
involves a double grid search over ca. Following Hansen (1997), the range
for the grid search is selected a priori to contain ca observations in between
the 15th (ca) and the 85th percentile (ca). This reduction in the grid range
is needed in order to avoid sorting too few observations in one regime for
extreme values of the thresholds. As a result, the appropriate ranges are
deﬁned as R =[ µ,ca] and R =[ µ,ca],f o rδ and δ respectively.
As the minimisation process for a three-regime/ two-threshold TAR pro-
17cess is numerically intensive, we rely on the estimation methodology proposed
by Hansen (1999) for multiple thresholds. This consists of a three-stage grid
search, where the second-stage estimation of the two-threshold model is made
conditional on the ﬁrst-stage single-threshold estimate of δ (either δ or δ),
t h et h i r ds t a g eb e i n gu s e da sar e ﬁnement.
Furthermore, ﬁnal estimates of slope parameters and standard errors for
the G7 group of countries are obtained by seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) estimation, in order to allow for potential correlation between the
disturbances of the diﬀerent ca equations, due to common unobservable fac-
tors.
Once the thresholds have been selected, according to standard asymptotic
theory, (1) is linear in the parameters. As with any simple dummy-variable
regression, it can be estimated by linear methods. However, statistical infer-
ence in a TAR model bears the diﬃculty that the thresholds δ and δ may be
not identiﬁed under the null hypothesis in question (Davies, 1987). In this
case, the usual χ2 distribution needs to be replaced by an approximated em-
pirical distribution obtained by bootstrapping the residuals (Hansen 1997).
In particular, artiﬁcial observations are calibrated using the restricted esti-
mates and are then used to obtained new estimates of the restricted and
unrestricted model (for an application, see Peel and Taylor 2002). The per-
centage of bootstrap samples — we run 1000 replications — for which the sim-
ulated likelihood-ratio statistics exceeds the actual one forms the bootstrap
approximation to the p-value of the test statistic under question.
The estimation and testing results are presented in Table 2. First the
test results: when we test the null hypothesis a single threshold for all coun-
18tries versus the alternative hypothesis of two thresholds, we reject the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative. This is consistent with three regimes
for each country - a surplus adjustment regime, a deﬁcit adjustment regime,
and an inertia (absence of adjustment) regime. Second, when we test the hy-
pothesis that the current account follows a random walk inside the ‘inertia’
regime against the alternative that it follows a mean reverting autoregressive
process inside the inertia regime (a more general formulation of the threshold
model) we are unable to reject the null of a random walk inside the inertia
regime. In summary, the statistical tests ﬁnd evidence of non-linear current
account adjustment and also identify signiﬁcant thresholds beyond which
current account adjustment takes place.
- Insert table 2 here -
We now discuss the parameter estimates for the threshold models esti-
mated for each G7 country. To repeat, these estimates allow for country-
speciﬁc means, country and regime-speciﬁc thresholds, and country and
regime speciﬁc autoregressive dynamics. A number of interesting results
are obtained. First, as suggested by Chairman Greenspan’s comment cited
above, we see there is wide cross-country variation in the estimated current
account deﬁcit adjustment thresholds. For example, the estimated deﬁcit
adjustment threshold for the US is -2.18 percent of net output, while for
Japan it is only -0.18 percent of net output. This means that empirically,
there is no evidence from these estimates of systematic adjustment in the US
current account deﬁc i tu n t i lt h ed e ﬁcit exceeds -4.19 percent of net output
19(equal to the mean of -2.01 plus the threshold of -2.18), while for Japan,
adjustment begins to take place when the surplus falls below 3.77 percent of
net output (equal to the mean of 3.95 plus the deﬁcit threshold of -0.18). We
estimate a similar pattern for the other ‘structural’ surplus countries, France
and Germany. For France, we estimate that adjustment begins to take place
once the surplus falls below 0.51 percent of net output; for Germany ad-
justment begins to take place once the surplus falls below the mean of 6.19
before uniﬁcation and 1.19 percent after uniﬁcation. Second, we see that
for most G7 countries, there are thresholds of adjustment to current account
surpluses as well as for current account deﬁcits. Third, we see from Table 4
substantial cross-country variation in the estimated autoregressive dynamics
once countries cross their current account deﬁcit or surplus thresholds. For
deﬁcit adjustment episodes, the estimated autoregressive coeﬃcients range
from 0.827 for Germany to 0.973 for the US. For surplus adjustment episodes,
the estimated autoregressive coeﬃcients range from 0.777 in the UK to 0.944
in Italy.
- Insert table 3 here -
In the top panel of Table 3, we compute the half life of 1 , 2, and 3 percent
of net output displacements of the current account imbalance from the deﬁcit
threshold. In our equilibrium threshold model the speed of adjustment to
a given displacement from the deﬁcit (or surplus) threshold is a function of
the distance between the imbalances and the unconditional mean, not just
to the threshold itself (as for example would be the case for a so called band
threshold model). As is evident from the table, the US stands out in terms
20of the slow speed of adjustment to current account deﬁc i t s ,e v e nw h e ni ti s
a d j u s t i n g .F o re x a m p l e ,i nr e s p o n s et oa2p e r c e n to fG D Pd i s p l a c e m e n to f
the US current account from the estimated deﬁcit threshold of -2.18 percent
( t oad e ﬁcit of -4.18 percent of net output), it takes the US nearly 10 quarters
on average to close 1 percentage point of that displacement, whereas for the
average G6 country (G7 minus US), it takes fewer than 5 quarters to close
such a displacement. In the bottom panel of Table 3, we compute the half
life of 1, 2, and 3 percent of net output displacements of the current account
imbalance from the upper (surplus) threshold. As before, we estimate sub-
stantial cross-country variation in the speeds of adjustment to displacements
of the current account away from the adjustment thresholds. Note that the
US actually adjusts faster than the G6 average to current account surpluses.
- Insert table 4 here -
In Table 4, we present some summary statistics for the three current
account regimes estimated for each G7 country. We see that the average
G6 (excluding the US) country spent only roughly 25 percent of the 1979-
2003 sample in the inertia regime and thus spent 75 percent of the sample
adjusting to either current account surpluses (34 percent of the sample) or
deﬁcits (41 percent of the sample). Of course, there is cross-country varia-
tion, but the G6 country spending the maximum time in the inertia regime
was Canada, which spent 48 percent of sample in the inertia regime. The US,
by contrast, spent a full 63 percent of the sample in the inertia regime, and
only 17 percent of the sample adjusting to current account deﬁcits, and 20
percent of the time adjusting to current account surpluses. The bottom panel
21of Table 4 reports, for each country, the average adjustment per quarter that
actually occurred during the sample (as a percentage of net output) when
that country was estimated to be in a deﬁcit adjustment regime or a surplus
adjustment regime. These adjustments are measured from the peak current
account imbalance reached during the adjustment episode to the level reached
when the adjustment regime concludes. Thus, for the average G6 country,
once current account deﬁcits (relative to mean) peak and begin to contract,
they adjust at an average rate of 0.51 percent of net output per quarter (2
percent of net output per year) until adjustment concludes with the current
account imbalance crossing the deﬁcit adjustment threshold. The table also
shows that for the G6, on average, once current account surpluses peak and
begin to contract, they adjust at an even faster average rate 0.62 percent of
net output per quarter (2.4 percent of net output per year) until adjustment
concludes with the current account imbalance crossing the surplus adjust-
ment threshold. Evidently, adjustment of current account imbalances in the
US data is much more sluggish than the G6 average, with the US current
account imbalance falling by roughly 0.3 percent of net output during each
quarter (1.2 percent per year) that the US is in an adjustment regime.
To summarize the results of this Section, having tested and found evidence
of non-linearity in G7 current account adjustment data, we estimated for each
G7 country a threshold autoregressive model which allows for asymmetric,
country-speciﬁc thresholds, country speciﬁc means, and regime and country
speciﬁc speeds of adjustment. We ﬁnd evidence in favor of deﬁcit as well as
surplus thresholds for most countries, as well as evidence of substantial cross-
country diﬀe r e n c e si nt h ea m o u n to ft i m es p e n ti nt h et h r e ed i ﬀerent regimes,
22as well as in the pace at which adjustments occur. Compared with other G7
countries, the US has large thresholds of current account adjustment, spends
relatively little time in adjustment regimes, and adjusts slowly even when
in those imbalance adjustment regimes. In the next section of the paper,
we explore what happens to the probability distributions of exchange rates,
stock prices, and interest rate diﬀerentials during current account adjustment
regimes in each country.
4 Exchange Rates, Stock Prices, and Inter-
est Rates During Current Account Adjust-
ment Regimes
In this section, we investigate what happens to the probability distribu-
tions of nominal exchange rate changes, stock price index changes, and long
term interest rate diﬀerentials during the various current account adjustment
regimes that we estimate for each country in Section 3. The motivation is to
determine whether or not crossing the current account adjustment threshold
is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions for exchange
rates, stock prices, and interest diﬀerentials. We speciﬁcally account for — and
allow for current account regime speciﬁc shifts in — autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity as well as for shifts in the mean by estimating GARCH
models for nominal exchange rate changes, stock prices changes, and interest
diﬀerentials. We also in this section explore, for the US, whether or not the
expectation of a future adjustment in the current account imbalance is as-
23sociated with a present shift in the probability distribution exchange rates,
stock prices, or interest diﬀerentials.
Switching models of exchange rates were introduced in Engel and Hamil-
ton (1990). They hypothesized that the log diﬀerence in the nominal ex-
change rate is a stochastic process with a regime-speciﬁc mean and a regime
speciﬁc (but constant) variance. In their model, the regimes themselves are
unobservable states; the probability that the exchange rate is in a particular
regime is inferred from the exchange rate data itself. Our approach is dif-
ferent, but similarly motivated. Having found evidence of three regimes of
current adjustment for each G7 country, we estimate and test whether or not
being in a current account adjustment regime is associated with shifts in the
drift and variance of exchange rate changes for that country. We allow for
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in exchange rate changes. We
estimate similar models for the log diﬀerence in stock price changes and for
long term interest rate diﬀerentials, allowing for regime speciﬁcd r i f t sa n d
variances.
The GARCH models we estimate in this section are of the form
∆t = d + d1DUMSt + d2DUMDt + ut (2)
σ
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t−1 + c1DUMSt + c2DUMDt
where DUMDt is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when a
country is in a deﬁcit adjustment regime, DUMSt is a dummy variable that
takes on a value of 1 when a country is in a surplus adjustment regime, σ2
t
is the conditional variance of ut,a n d∆t is the log diﬀerence in the exchange
24rate, the log diﬀerence in the equity price index, or the interest rate diﬀeren-
tial (adjusted for ﬁrst order autocorrelation) observed at a monthly frequency.
Thus, in each quarter in which a country is in a particular regime, there will
be three observations on the monthly change in the asset price during that
q u a r t e r .B e c a u s eI t a l ya n dF r a n c ew e r ep a r to ft h eE M Sd u r i n gm o s to ft h e
sample, the behavior of their exchange rates and interest rates reﬂected their
EMS commitments to stabilize their exchange rates vis a vis Germany. We
exclude them from the analysis of this section. Estimation is by maximum
likelihood. For each country, we report the results for the (log change) in
the trade weighted exchange rate, the (log change) in a broad stock market
index, and the diﬀerential between each county’s long term interest rate and
G7 average (adjusted for ﬁrst order autocorrelation). When signiﬁcant, we
also report the results for key bilateral exchange rates. In what follows ‘*’
indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, ‘**’ signiﬁc a n c ea tt h e1 0p e r -
cent level, and ‘***’ at the 15 percent level. Data sources are the IFS for
long-term interest rates and Bloomberg for exchange rates and stock market




For the US dollar index, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on the
surplus regime dummy is positive and the estimated coeﬃcient on the deﬁcit
r e g i m ed u m m yi sn e g a t i v e( T a b l e5 ) .T h i sm e a n st h a tt h ed o l l a ri n d e xt e n d s
25to appreciate during US surplus adjustment regimes, and to depreciate during
US deﬁcit adjustment regimes, although the coeﬃcients are not measured
precisely. For the pound, we estimate a statistically signiﬁcant shift in the
probability distribution of exchange rate changes that coincides with US
surplus adjustment regimes, in favor an appreciation of the dollar relative to
the pound. For the Canadian dollar, we estimate a statistically signiﬁcant
shift in the probability distribution of exchange rate changes that coincides
with US deﬁcit adjustment regimes, in favor a depreciation of the dollar
relative to the Canadian dollar. We also estimate a statistically signiﬁcant
rise in the volatility of the Canadian dollar exchange rate that coincides
with US deﬁcit adjustment regimes. For US equity prices, we estimate a
signiﬁcant (at the 12 percent level) fall in equity returns during US current
account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. We also estimate a signiﬁcant rise in
equity volatility that occurs during US current account adjustment regimes.
For long term interest rate diﬀerentials, we do estimate a signiﬁcant increase
in volatility during US current account surplus adjustment regimes.
Japanese Results
For the Yen index, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on the Japan cur-
rent account surplus adjustment regime dummy is positive and signiﬁcant,
indicating that the Yen index tends to appreciate during Japan’s current ac-
count surplus adjustment regimes (Table 6). For the Dollar-Yen exchange
rate, we estimate a statistically signiﬁcant increase in exchange rate volatility
during both Japan surplus adjustment regimes and Japan deﬁcit adjustment
regimes. We also obtain point estimates that suggest that the yen tends
26to appreciate relative to the dollar during Japanese current account surplus
regimes and to depreciate during Japanese current account deﬁcit adjustment
regimes, although these coeﬃcients are not measured precisely. For Japanese
equity prices, we estimate a signiﬁcant fall in equity volatility during Japan
current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. For long term interest rate diﬀer-
entials, we do estimate a signiﬁcant increase in volatility during both Japan’s
current account surplus adjustment regimes and current account deﬁcit ad-
justment regimes. We also estimate a signiﬁcant widening in Japanese long
term interest diﬀerential (it becomes larger in absolute value) during Japan’s
current account surplus adjustment regimes, as well as a widening during
Japan’s current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes (although the latter is
not signiﬁcant).
German Results
For the volatility of the DM index through 1998:12, we see that the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the German current account deﬁcit adjustment regime
dummy is positive and signiﬁcant (Table 7). For the Dollar-DM exchange
rate estimated through 1998:12, we estimate a statistically signiﬁcant depre-
ciation of the DM during German current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes.
For German equity prices, we estimate a signiﬁcant fall in equity volatility
during German current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. For long- term
interest rate diﬀerentials, we do estimate a signiﬁcant increase in volatility
during German current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. German interest
rate diﬀe r e n t i a l si n c r e a s ei na bsolute value during deﬁcit adjustment regimes
in before uniﬁcation, and narrow after uniﬁc a t i o n . W es p l i tt h es a m p l ea t
27uniﬁcation because of an obvious shift in the mean of the interest diﬀerential
series at that time.
UK and Canadian Results
For the Canadian dollar index, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on
the Canadian current account deﬁcit adjustment regime dummy is negative
and signiﬁcant, indicating that the CAD index tends to depreciate during
Canada’s current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes (Table 8). For the US
Dollar-Canada exchange rate, we estimate a similar result but it is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. For the UK, the most noteworthy result is a signiﬁ-
cant increase in equity returns during current account surplus adjustment
regimes, a fall in equity volatility during UK current account surplus ad-
justment regimes, and a rise in equity volatility during UK current account
deﬁcit adjustment regimes (Table 9). Because of a break in the UK equity
price data series at 1984:1, the UK equity sample is 1984:1 - 2003:9.
Summary of Results for Subsection 4.1
In this subsection, we have reported evidence of statistically signiﬁcant
shifts in the mean and variance of the probability distribution of several G7
exchange rates, equity prices, and interest rate diﬀerentials that occur in
conjunction the current account adjustment regimes estimated in section 3.
Our approach cannot answer the question of which triggers what, but we do
ﬁnd evidence that regimes of current account adjustment do coincide with
shifts in the distribution of some important asset prices. The estimates that
28are signiﬁcant tend to show exchange rate depreciation during current ac-
count deﬁcit regimes and exchange rate appreciation during current account
surplus regimes. We also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant increases in exchange
rate volatility during current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes for the US,
Japan, and Germany. For equity markets, we estimate that current account
deﬁcit adjustment regimes are associated with signiﬁcantly lower US equity
returns and higher US equity volatility, while in the UK, equity returns are
higher during current account surplus adjust regimes, equity volatility is
lower, while UK equity volatility is higher during current account deﬁcit
adjustment regimes.
- Insert tables 5-9 here -
4.2 Do Expectations of Future US Current Account
Adjustment Trigger Adjustment in Present Asset
Prices?
We now explore, for the US, whether or not the expectation of a future ad-
justment in the current account imbalance is associated with a present shift
in the probability distribution exchange rates, stock prices, or interest dif-
ferentials. As discussed previously, compared with other G7 countries, the
US has wide thresholds of current account adjustment, spends relatively lit-
tle time in adjustment regimes, and — as shown in Table 4 — adjusts slowly
even when in deﬁcit or surplus adjustment regimes. To capture the hypoth-
esis that expectations of future current account adjustment may have an
29impact on present asset prices, we augment our basic GARCH speciﬁcation
to include two additional dummy variables. Let DUMBD equal one when
−2.18 <c a<−1 and let DUMBS equal one when 1 <c a<2.15.T h u s
DUMBD equals one when the current account deﬁcit is more than one per-
centage point below its mean but still less (in absolute value) than the deﬁcit
threshold, while DUMBD equals one when the current account is more than
o n ep e r c e n t a g ep o i n ta b o v ei t sm e a nb u ts t i l ll e s s( i na b s o l u t ev a l u e )t h a n
the surplus threshold. Our speciﬁcation becomes
∆t = d + d1DUMSt + d2DUMDt + d3DUMBSt + d4DUMBDt + ut (3)
σ
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t−1 + c1DUMSt + c2DUMDt + c3DUMBSt + c4DUMBDt
In order to focus on signiﬁcant results, we proceed in two steps. In the
ﬁr s ts t e p ,w ee s t i m a t es p e c i ﬁcation (3). In the second step, we drop any
dummy variable that in the ﬁr s ts t a g ee s t i m a t ei sn o ts i g n i ﬁcant at the 15
percent level or better. The results are reported in Table 10.
- Insert table 10 here -
From Table 10, we see that when current account deﬁcits are large but
before the US enters a current account deﬁcit adjustment regime, the dollar
index starts to depreciate, at a pace of roughly 7 percent per year. We also
see that the volatility of the dollar index is lower when deﬁcits are small but
before the US enters a current account surplus adjustment regime. As for
30equity prices, the results reported in Table 5 are robust to the inclusion of the
two additional dummy variables. We continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect of current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes on equity returns, and
as i g n i ﬁcant positive eﬀect on equity volatility. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd
that equity volatility is lower when deﬁcits are small but before they have
entered a current account surplus adjustment regime. Finally, we see that
long-term interest diﬀerentials in favor of the US are larger when current
account deﬁcits are small.
5 Assessing the Present US Current Account
Deﬁcit
In this section we draw on our empirical results to take stock of the present
US current account deﬁcit. Our empirical results indicate that compared to
other G7 countries, the US over our sample exhibited relatively wide thresh-
olds within which current account adjustment is absent and relatively slow
speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially the deﬁcit threshold,
are crossed. Moreover, the present US current account deﬁcit substantially
exceeds — and has for some time — our estimated thresholds of current account
deﬁcit adjustment for the US. We explore several possible explanations. The
ﬁrst is that the threshold model, while a useful description of current account
adjustment for other G7 countries, does not apply to the US and that the
present deﬁcit of nearly 6 percent of GDP is in fact sustainable. The second
explanation is that there are thresholds of current account adjustment for
31the US, but that adjustment has been delayed over the past several years,
due to unusual circumstances that were not in evidence during the sample
over which the models were estimated, 1979-2003. These circumstances could
include: (i) the low level of global real interest rates (which support higher
levels of investment and lower levels of saving in the US than would be the
case with historically average or above average real interest rates); (ii) the
more muted and less uniform decline in the dollar than occurred, for exam-
ple during the 1985 - 1987 Plaza-Louvre episode (reﬂecting the intervention
activities of Asian central banks); (iii) the fact that the US continues to run
a substantial surplus in dividends, interest, and proﬁts on its stock of foreign
assets compared with the dividends, interest, and proﬁts that is pays out
on its much larger stock of foreign liabilities; (iv) the adjustment in the net
foreign liability position of the US that occurs as a result of dollar depreci-
a t i o n( w h i c hi n2 0 0 3o ﬀset almost 80 percent of that years current account
deﬁcit). We review and evaluate these potential explanations for the absence
of adjustment to date in the US current account deﬁcit even though it has
passed well beyond the thresholds that would have triggered adjustments in
other G7 countries. We begin by reviewing the data on the US net foreign
liability position.
Almost all claims held by foreigners against the US are dollar denom-
inated, while US claims against the rest of the world are denominated in
foreign currency. Thus, as has been emphasized by Pierre Olivier Gourin-
chas and Helene Rey, a real depreciation of the dollar, by increasing the real
value of US holdings of foreign assets relative to foreign holdings of US assets
(which of course are dollar denominated liabilities of the US) is an impor-
32tant channel of international adjustment, over and above the impact of said
real depreciation on the trade balance. This channel operates by narrowing
the gap between the market value of foreign claims against the US and the
market value of US claims against the rest of the world. In eﬀect, because of
the willingness on the part of the rest of the world to lend to the US in the
form of dollar denominated debt and equity instruments, there is a transfer
of wealth to the US from the rest of the world as result of a real depreci-
ation of the dollar, all other things — including other asset prices — equal,
aq u a l i ﬁcation to which I return below. It is important to note that while
the US beneﬁts from this ‘transfer’ eﬀect which increases the real value of
US assets relative to US liabilities, there is of course another implication of
real dollar depreciation which is the terms of trade deterioration that results
from it. This terms of trade deterioration lowers the real purchasing power of
any given ﬂow of US income, and it increases the relative price of imported
inputs to US based production. In addition, as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ have
emphasized, moving toward current account sustainability requires that re-
sources be shifted from non tradable to tradable production. Empirically,
this channel of international adjustment is potentially quite important in
complementing the traditional channel in which the factors that contribute
to a narrowing of the current account deﬁcit also result in a real depreciation
of the dollar.
Every year, the US Commerce Department reports data on the net foreign
liability position of the US, and it provides detail on the revaluation of US
assets and liabilities that occurs as a result of exchange rate movements, as
well as asset price changes. The data on net foreign assets and liabilities is
33subject to substantial revisions. However, until quite recently — April 2005
— the Commerce Department did not go back and revise the exchange rate
and asset price revaluation attributions to make them consistent with the
revised data on foreign assets and liabilities. However, at the request of one
of the authors of this paper, the Commerce Department has now revised
the exchange rate and asset price revaluation attributions to make them
consistent with the revised data on foreign assets and liabilities. The newly
released data are reported in Table 11 and they tell an interesting story.
- Insert table 11 here -
We begin with the most recent data available as of the time of writing, for
year end 2003. The US began 2003 with gross foreign assets of $6.6 trillion
and gross foreign liabilities of $9.2, for a stock of net foreign liabilities of $2.6
trillion. During that year the US ran a current account deﬁcit of $530 billion
which, after adjustment for errors and omissions, resulted in a net capital
inﬂow of $546 billion. In a simple textbook model which abstracts from asset
price or exchange rate changes, this should have resulted in a dollar-for-dollar
increase in net foreign liabilities, to approximately $3.1 trillion. During that
year, asset price changes in local currency terms were substantial, but they
roughly canceled out, having a minimal impact on the net foreign liabilities
of the US. By contrast, the exchange rate valuation eﬀects were substantial.
Dollar depreciation that year increased the value of US assets abroad by $398
billion. By year end 2003, the net foreign liabilities of the US were valued
at $2.7 trillion dollars, an increase of only $100 billion compared with the
previously discussed US capital inﬂow of $545 billion.
34Of course, a real dollar depreciation has a one-oﬀ impact on the value of
US net foreign assets, and a stabilization of net foreign liabilities as a ratio
of US GDP will require a reduction in the ratio of the current account to
GDP. However, the current account deﬁcit to GDP ratio need not return to
zero for sustainability to be achieved. Indeed, a US current account deﬁcit
to GDP ratio in the range of 2 to 3 percent is probably consistent with
sustainability at something like the global level of interest rates and equity
valuations. Consider this fact: in 2001, US net foreign liabilities were 22.8
percent of US nominal GDP. Two years later, US net foreign liabilities to
GDP had risen by a very modest 1.3 percentage points, to 24.1 percent of
GDP, notwithstanding current account deﬁcits of roughly 5 percent of GDP
in each of 2002 and 2003. The data in Table 11 show that exchange rate
valuation eﬀects have been important in previous years. For example, in
2002, the exchange rate revaluation of US foreign assets oﬀset 40 percent of
the foreign capital inﬂow; in 1994 and 1995, the exchange rate valuation eﬀect
oﬀset 52% of the net capital inﬂow. Of course, exchange rate appreciation has
t h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect. Of the $1.3 trillion rise in US net foreign liabilities that
accumulated in the three years 1999-2001, $540 billion , or 41 percent, was
due to the valuation impact of the appreciation of the dollar that occurred
during those years.
Another factor that should be considered when thinking about sustain-
ability and adjustment of international imbalances is the longstanding ev-
idence for the US of substantial diﬀerences in the rates of return that US
investors earn on their foreign investments compared with the rate of return
that foreign investors earn and require on their investments in the US. That
35is, even though the US is, and has been for many years, the world’s largest
‘net debtor’, with net foreign liabilities estimated to be some $2.7 trillion
dollars at year end 2003, the US still to this day earns more interest and
dividends on its foreign assets than it pays out on its foreign liabilities, even
though the latter exceed the former by nearly 3 trillion dollars. Speciﬁcally,
for 2004, income receipts on US assets abroad totaled $368 billion while in-
come payments on foreign assets in the US totaled $344 billion. How can
the US continue to run a surplus on international investment income with its
large stock of international liabilities? Diﬀerences in portfolio composition
can probably account for some of this. For example, in recent years 60 per-
cent of US assets abroad were invested in foreign equities and foreign direct
investment. By contrast, only 40 percent of foreign claims against the US
were invested in US equities and direct investment. However, in order to
account for the persistent surplus in the US international investment income
account, portfolio composition is probably not suﬃcient. In addition, it is
likely the case that the US earns consistent higher returns on its FDI than
the rest of the world earns on its US FDI.
We see that in both 2003 and 2004, the US earned high returns on FDI,
earning proﬁts of 8.7 percent of FDI assets at market value in 2004 and 9.2
percent of FDI assets at market value in 2003. By contrast, foreign owned
direct investment assets in the US earned 4.3 percent of assets at market value
in 2004 and 3.4 percent of assets at market value in 2003. This disparity is
not a recent phenomenon. As the Table shows, the US has consistently since
1989 — the year the US net foreign asset position turned negative — earned
higher returns on its FDI assets than foreigners have earned on their US
36investments. The Table also reports the rate of return on non-FDI assets
and liabilities. The absolute return diﬀerentials are much smaller, and are
consistently negative, indicating that foreign non-FDI holdings pay slightly
higher returns than US non-FDI holdings. Once we take into account the
diﬀerences in portfolio composition between US assets abroad and foreign
assets in the US (reported in Table 12), we obtain the time series on the
total return diﬀerential reported in Table 11.
- Insert table 12 here -
Another factor that may have delayed adjustment in the US current ac-
count is the more modest decline in the broad, real trade weighted dollar as
compared with the decline in the dollar that occurred during the 1985-1988.
The Federal Reserve’s real broad trade weighted dollar index is plotted in
Figure 1.
- Insert Figure 1 here -
In the three years after the dollar’s peak in early 1985, the broad dollar
index declined by 30 percent. By contrast, in the three years since the dollar’s
recent peak in early 2002, it has declined by less than 15 percent. Obviously,
the intervention by Asian central banks has limited the depreciation of the
dollar against a number of signiﬁcant US trading partners.
Our ﬁnal point is that the US current account deﬁc i ti si np a r ta ne n d o g e -
nous, general equilibrium outcome of global ﬁnancial and macroeconomic
integration. As such, we believe it reﬂects a global excess supply of saving
37relative proﬁtable investment opportunities. In a world in which there is a
global excess supply of saving relative to investment, we would expect to
ﬁnd and indeed ﬁnd today that global real interest rates are low and that
some country or group of countries must absorb the surplus of internationally
mobile capital. Required real rates return - as measured by yields on TIPS
in the US and indexed gilts in the UK - are unusually low (below 2 percent
as of this writing). In the late 90s, the opposite was the case and rapid (in
retrospect unsustainable) world investment rates surged ahead of savings,
pushing up real interest rates (Tips yields were at 4 percent in March 2000
when the bubble peaked). Although no one can say for sure how long the
present imbalance between global saving and investment will persist, it seems
clear that this global imbalance between saving and investment is contribut-
ing to the size of the US current account deﬁcit and its failure to adjust as
May 2005.
- Insert table 13 here -
6C o n c l u s i o n
Are there thresholds of current account adjustment? This paper has reported
evidence in favour of this proposition. We found statistically signiﬁcant evi-
dence of diﬀering adjustment dynamics in the current-account-to-net-output
ratio for all of the G7 countries examined. In particular, each country dis-
played three regimes – a surplus regime and a deﬁcit regime in which the
38current account tended to revert towards its long-run mean, albeit at diﬀer-
ent speeds in each regime (showing that sign does indeed matter), and an
‘inertia regime’ in which, for intermediate levels of the current account bal-
ance between the surplus and deﬁcit regimes, current account adjustment was
negligible (showing that size also matters). We also showed, however, that
one size does not ﬁt all in the sense that we found signiﬁcant cross-country
variation in the size of the estimated thresholds. We also found substantial
cross-country variation in the estimated speed of adjustment once countries
cross their current account deﬁcit or surplus thresholds.
Our results support the ﬁndings of Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock,
by providing econometric evidence on the nonlinearities and diﬀerences in
current account adjustment across industrial countries. In line with their
results, countries with large deﬁcits such as the US exhibit relatively wide
thresholds within which current account adjustment is absent and relatively
slow speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially the deﬁcit thresh-
old, are crossed. While our analysis focuses on the relatively homogeneous
post Bretton-Woods period, Barry Eichengreen and Muge Adalet present an
historical analysis of current account reversals starting from the gold stan-
dard period and ﬁnd evidence of substantial diﬀerences in current account
adjustments episodes also across time.
We also found evidence of statistically signiﬁcant shifts in the mean and
variance found evidence of statistically signiﬁcant shifts in the mean and
variance of the probability distribution of several G7 exchange rates, eq-
uity prices, and interest rate diﬀerentials that occur in conjunction with
our estimated current account adjustment regimes. In particular, we found
39a tendency towards exchange rate depreciation during current account deﬁcit
regimes and exchange rate appreciation during current account surplus regimes,
and statistically signiﬁcant increases in exchange rate volatility during cur-
rent account deﬁcit adjustment regimes for the US, Japan, and Germany.
This suggests that a multivariate approach involving the joint modeling of
exchange rates and the current account within a nonlinear framework would
be a fruitful exercise, as well as being consistent with substantial evidence
in favor of nonlinear adjustment in real exchange rates (see, e.g., Obstfeld
and Taylor (1998); Taylor and Taylor, 2004). This is an avenue we intend to
pursue in future research.
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45Table 1
Country Terasvirta Linearity Tests:
CAN Marginal significance level  0.369
FRA Marginal significance level  0.029
GER Marginal significance level  0.035
ITA Marginal significance level  0.136
JAP Marginal significance level  0.027
UK Marginal significance level  0.184
US Marginal significance level  0.069
46Table 2
CA/NO           
Q1 1979- Q3 2003
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold above band below 'Surplus' 'Deficit'
1.41 -4.05 0.927 1.000 0.930 -1.792
(0.048) (0.060)
2.13 -1.13 0.931 1.000 0.910 1.646
(0.048) (0.045)
2.84 0.00 0.880 1.000 0.827 6.185 Pre-1991
(0.070) (0.064) 1.496 Post-1991
0.00 -0.37 0.944 1.000 0.867 -0.269
(0.058) (0.059)
0.84 -0.18 0.908 1.000 0.894 3.951
(0.058) (0.037)
1.08 0.00 0.777 1.000 0.929 -1.764
(0.073) (0.064)
2.15 -2.18 0.907 1.000 0.973 -2.011
(0.039) (0.034)
Bootstrap:
LR-test for band coefficient equal to 1 (SUR): marg.signif. level = 0.520









Slope coefficients (estimation 
by SUR)
Means Thresholds (asymmetric band)
Threshold models of de-meaned CA/NO
47Table 3
HALF LIFE OF DISPLACEMENT FROM DEFICIT THRESHOLD (IN QUARTERS)
1 percent 2 percent 3 percent
Canada 1.14 2.49 3.30
France 2.84 4.08 4.79
Germany 3.65 3.64 3.64
Italy 3.18 3.84 4.13
Japan 4.79 5.48 5.69
UK 9.41 9.41 9.41
G6 Avg 4.17 4.82 5.16
Us 6.25 9.99 12.49
HALF LIFE OF DISPLACEMENT FROM SURPLUS THRESHOLD (IN QUARTERS)
Canada 3.07 4.58 5.48
France 2.43 3.88 4.84
Germany 1.09 1.81 2.32
Italy 12.03 12.03 12.03
Japan 3.29 4.50 5.13
UK 1.09 1.56 1.82
G6 Avg 3.83 4.72 5.27
Us 1.77 2.82 3.53
48Table 4
PERCENT OF SAMPLE SPENT IN EACH REGIME
CANADA FRANCE GERMANY ITALY JAPAN UK G6 AVG US
SURPLUS 34 23 20 51 36 37 34 20
INERTIA 48 35 20 3 30 17 25 63
DEFICIT 18 42 60 46 34 46 41 17
ADJUSTMENT PER QUARTER DURING  ADJUSTMENT REGIMES
(Measured from peak and as percent of net output)
CANADA FRANCE GERMANY ITALY JAPAN UK G6 AVG US
SURPLUS 0.687 0.507 1.081 0.467 0.336 0.644 0.620333 0.303
DEFICIT 0.604 0.246 0.693 0.575 0.361 0.612 0.515167 0.327
49Table 5
     Asset Prices During US Current Account Adjustment Regimes
US Dollar Index
∆ t    =   -.0004  +  .0035DUMS t -  .0028DUMD t + u t
                       (.0028)                 (.0025)
σ 
2 t   =    .0001  - .0325 u
2
t-1  +  .5976σ 
2 t-1   +  .00002DUMSt -  .00002 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.00003)              (.00003)
         Pound per Dollar
∆ t    =   -.0013  +  .0101DUMS t -   .0019DUMD t + u t
                        (.0044)*              (.0038)
σ 
2 t   =    .0002  + .2151 u
2
t-1  +  .6013σ 
2 t-1   +  .0001DUMSt -  .00002 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.0001)                (.00007)
Canadian Dollars per US Dollar
∆ t    =   .0009  +  .0006DUMS t -   .0044DUMD t + u t
                        (.0019)               (.0025)**
σ 
2 t   =    .0002 -  .0161 u
2
t-1  - .5754σ 
2 t-1   +  .00001DUMSt +  .0002 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.0001)               (.00007)*
Equity Prices
∆ t    =   .0107  -  .0029DUMS t -   .0139DUMD t + u t
                        (.0061)              (.0091)***
σ 
2 t   =    .0014  + .0004 u
2
t-1  +  .0681σ 
2 t-1   +  .00027DUMSt +  .00223 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.0004)                (.0011)*
Long Term Interest Differentials
∆ t    =   .0094  -  .0154DUMS t -   .0014DUMD t + u t
                        (.0304)              (.0181)
σ 
2 t   =    .0002  -  .0177 u
2
t-1  +  .9788σ 
2 t-1   +  .00305DUMSt +  .00007 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.0009)*               (.00014)
50Table 6
Asset Prices During Japan Current Account Adjustment Regimes
Yen Index
∆ t    =   -.0016 +  .0093DUMS t +  .0005DUMD t + u t
                       (.0034)*              (.0031)
σ 
2 t   =    .0006  - .2115 u
2
t-1  -  .2848σ 
2 t-1   +  .00012DUMSt -  .00005 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00013)              (.00012)
         Dollar per Yen
∆ t    =   .0008  +  .0066DUMS t -  .0044DUMD t + u t
                        (.0050)              (.0048)
σ 
2 t   =    .00001 -  .0095 u
2
t-1  +  .9383σ 
2 t-1   +  .00012DUMSt +  .00008 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.00005)*              (.00003)*
Equity Prices
∆ t    =  -.0031 +  .0105DUMS t +   .0093DUMD t + u t
                       (.0084)              (.0076)
σ 
2 t   =    .0006  + .1245 u
2
t-1  +  .7605σ 
2 t-1   -  .00017DUMSt -  .00044 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0003)                (.00029)***
Long Term Interest Differentials
∆ t    =  -.1045  -  .0153DUMS t -   .0844DUMD t + u t
                        (.0344)              (.0371)*
σ 
2 t   =    .0049  +  .0082 u
2
t-1  -  .1245σ 
2 t-1   +  .028796DUMSt +  .03240 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0142)*               (.01493)*
51Table 7
     Asset Prices During German Current Account Adjustment Regimes
DM  Index
∆ t    =    .0021 -  .0013DUMS t -  .0012DUMD t + u t
                       (.0014)               (.0012)
σ 
2 t   =    .00002 + .0886 u
2
t-1 +  .1619σ 
2 t-1   +  .00001DUMSt +  .00003 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00001)              (.00001)*
         Dollar per DM
∆ t    = - .0058  -  .0013DUMS t -  .0082DUMD t + u t
                        (.0066)              (.0053)***
σ 
2 t   =    .00127 +  .0921 u
2
t-1  -  .2801σ 
2 t-1   -  .00004DUMSt +  .00008 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0004)                (.00031)
Equity Prices
∆ t    =   .0037 -  .0025DUMS t +   .0053DUMD t + u t
                       (.0144)              (.0102)
σ 
2 t   =    .0015  + .0726 u
2
t-1  +  .7386σ 
2 t-1   -  .00026DUMSt -  .00115 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0006)                (.00051)*
Long Term Interest Differentials
1979:1 – 1990:12
∆ t    =  -.0129  -  .0282DUMS t -   .2147DUMD t + u t
                        (.0481)              (.0541)*
σ 
2 t   =    .0242  +  .2351 u
2
t-1  -  .0644σ 
2 t-1   +  .01303DUMSt +  .03635 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0122)                (.02499)***
1991:1 – 1998:12
∆ t    =   .0074  -  .0619DUMS t -   .0358DUMD t + u t
                        (.0927)              (.0247)***
σ 
2 t   =   -.0001  +  .0804 u
2
t-1  +  .7183σ 
2 t-1   +  .01583DUMSt +  .00455 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0152)                (.00294)***
52Table 8
     Asset Prices During UK Current Account Adjustment Regimes
Pound  Index
∆ t    =   -.0013 +  .0012DUMS t +  .0019DUMD t + u t
                       (.0029)               (.0028)
σ 
2 t   =    .00011 + .2775 u
2
t-1 +  .5646σ 
2 t-1   -  .00007DUMSt -  .00008 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00005)***         (.00005)**
   
Dollar per Pound
∆ t    =  .0049   -  .0093DUMS t -  .0035DUMD t + u t
                        (.0044)*             (.0045)
σ 
2 t   =    .00024 +  .1959 u
2
t-1  +  .5747σ 
2 t-1   -  .00004DUMSt +  .00001 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0001)                (.0001)
Equity Prices
∆ t    =  - .0006 +  .0185DUMS t +   .0048DUMD t + u t
                       (.0082)*               (.0081)
σ 
2 t   =    .0040  + .0224 u
2
t-1  - .8964σ 
2 t-1   -  .00084DUMSt +  .00091 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.0003)*               (.00070)
Long Term Interest Differentials
∆ t    =   .0312  +  .0073DUMS t +   .0177DUMD t + u t
                        (.032)                 (.028)
σ 
2 t   =    .00037  +  .0461 u
2
t-1  +  .9402σ 
2 t-1   +  .00048DUMSt -  .00037 DUMDt
                                                                                            (.0018)                (.0012)
53Table 9
     Asset Prices During Canada Current Account Adjustment Regimes
CAD  Index
∆ t    =    .0002 -  .0015DUMS t -  .0025DUMD t + u t
                       (.0014)             (.0017)***
σ 
2 t   =    .00004 + .1961 u
2
t-1 +  .4708σ 
2 t-1   -  .000002DUMSt +  .000002 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00001)              (.00002)
   
US Dollar per Canadian Dollar
∆ t    =   .0003  -  .0018DUMS t -  .0021DUMD t + u t
                       (.0014)                (.0018)
σ 
2 t   =    .00001 +  .0608 u
2
t-1  +  .8727σ 
2 t-1   +  .00004DUMSt +  .00002 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.00006)               (.00005)
Equity Prices
∆ t    =   .0051 +  .0030DUMS t -   .0030DUMD t + u t
                       (.0067)                 (.0065)
σ 
2 t   =    .0007  + .0534 u
2
t-1  + .7576σ 
2 t-1   -  .00041DUMSt -  .00062 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0002)***         (.00047)
Long Term Interest Differentials
∆ t    =   .1855  -  .0429DUMS t +   .0300DUMD t + u t
                        (.0605)              (.0331)
σ 
2 t   =    .0124  +  .1002 u
2
t-1  +  .6336σ 
2 t-1   +  .05082DUMSt +  .00013 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0033)***           (.00396)
54Table 10
Asset Prices Before and During US Current Account Adjustment Regimes
US Dollar Index
∆ t    =    .0006  -  .0064DUMBD t + u t
                                    (.0033)**
σ 
2 t   =    .00012  - .05 u
2
t-1  +  .7083σ 
2 t-1   -  .00006DUMBSt
                                                                                                     (.00003)*
Equity Prices
∆ t    =   .0115  -   .0131DUMD t + u t
                                     (.0087)***
σ 
2 t   =    .0015  + .0058 u
2
t-1  +  .1106σ 
2 t-1   -  .0007DUMBSt +  .0019 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.0003)*                 (.00097)*
Long Term Interest Differentials
∆ t    =  -.0020  +  .0384DUMBS t
                                        (.0194)*
σ 
2 t   =    .0003  +  .0241 u
2





1989 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US owned assets abroad
Total Assets 2,350,235 3,964,558 5,379,128 6,174,518 7,390,427 7,393,643 6,898,707 6,613,320 7,863,968
US Private Assets 2,094,878 3,703,433 5,158,094 5,941,744 7,169,782 7,180,075 6,683,092 6,369,409 7,595,619
        FDI Assets 832,460 1,363,792 1,879,285 2,279,601 2,839,639 2,694,014 2,314,934 2,039,780 2,730,289
        Foreign Securities 314,294 1,203,925 1,751,183 2,052,995 2,525,341 2,385,353 2,114,734 1,846,879 2,474,374
        Other US Private Assets 948,124 1,135,716 1,527,626 1,609,148 1,804,802 2,100,708 2,253,424 2,482,750 2,390,956
Income Receipts
Total Receipts 160270 208065 254534 258871 290474 347614 283761 263861 291354 365886
FDI Receipts 61981 95260 115323 103963 131626 151839 128665 147291 187522 237564
Returns on US owned assets abroad
Return on all Assets 8.0% 6.3% 5.5% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 3.8% 3.8% 4.4% 4.7%
Return on FDI 9.0% 8.5% 7.2% 5.5% 5.8% 5.3% 4.8% 6.4% 9.2% 8.7%
Return on non-FDI assets 7.5% 5.1% 4.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.3% 3.3% 2.5% 2.3% 2.5%
Foreign-owned assets in the US
Total Liabilities 2,397,222 4,270,394 6,201,860 7,249,895 8,437,115 8,982,199 9,206,868 9,166,727 10,514,958
Liabilities to Private Foreigners2,055,476 3,587,521 5,328,144 6,353,721 7,486,027 7,951,491 8,124,572 7,954,004 9,040,797
         FDI Liabilities 534,734 1,005,726 1,637,408 2,179,035 2,798,193 2,783,235 2,560,294 2,025,345 2,435,539
         Securities and Currency (Cash, US 716,523 1,466,328 2,262,490 2,675,016 3,042,633 3,260,616 3,459,610 3,545,585 4,251,500
         Other Liabilities to Private Foreigne 804,219 1,115,467 1,428,246 1,499,670 1,645,201 1,907,640 2,104,668 2,383,074 2,353,758
Income Receipts
Total Payments -141463 -189353 -244195 -257554 -280037 -329864 -263120 -259626 -261106 -344925
FDI Payments -7045 -30318 -42950 -38418 -53437 -56910 -12783 -46460 -68657 -105252
Returns on US owned assets abroad
Return on all Liabilities 7.1% 5.5% 4.9% 4.2% 3.9% 3.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 3.3%
Return on FDI 1.8% 4.0% 3.5% 2.3% 2.5% 2.0% 0.5% 1.8% 3.4% 4.3%
Return on non-FDI Liabilities 8.4% 5.9% 5.3% 4.8% 4.5% 4.8% 4.0% 3.2% 2.7% 3.0%
Return Differentials
Total 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.6% 1.4%
FDI 7.2% 4.5% 3.7% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 4.3% 4.5% 5.8% 4.4%
Non-FDI -0.9% -0.8% -0.7% -0.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.5%
57Figure 1
US real broad trade weighted dollar index











1989 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Portfolio Shares
 Private US Investment Abroad
         FDI 39.7% 36.8% 36.4% 38.4% 39.6% 37.5% 34.6% 32.0% 35.9%
         Securities and Currency 15.0% 32.5% 34.0% 34.6% 35.2% 33.2% 31.6% 29.0% 32.6%
         Other Private Assets 45.3% 30.7% 29.6% 27.1% 25.2% 29.3% 33.7% 39.0% 31.5%
Private Foreign Investment in the US
         FDI 26.0% 28.0% 30.7% 34.3% 37.4% 35.0% 31.5% 25.5% 26.9%
         Securities and Currency 34.9% 40.9% 42.5% 42.1% 40.6% 41.0% 42.6% 44.6% 47.0%
         Other Private Assets 39.1% 31.1% 26.8% 23.6% 22.0% 24.0% 25.9% 30.0% 26.0%
59